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Abstract—On September 8, 2016, the third NASA New Frontiers 
mission launched on an Atlas V 411.  The Origins, Spectral 
Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security-Regolith 
Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) will rendezvous with asteroid Bennu in 
2018, collect a sample in 2020, and return that sample to Earth 
in September 2023.  The development team has overcome a 
number of challenges in order to design and build a system that 
will make contact with an unexplored, airless, low-gravity body.  
This paper will provide an overview of the mission, then focus 
in on the system-level challenges and some of the key system-
level processes.  Some of the lessons here are unique to the type 
of mission, like discussion of operating at a largely-unknown, 
low-gravity object.  Other lessons, particularly from the build 
phase, have broad implications.  The OSIRIS-REx risk 
management process was particularly effective in achieving an 
on-time and under-budget development effort.  The systematic 
requirements management and verification and the system 
validation also helped identify numerous potential problems.  
The final assessment of the OSIRIS-REx performance will need 
to wait until the sample is returned in 2023, but this post-launch 
assessment will capture some of the key systems-engineering 
lessons from the development team. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On September 8, 2016, the third NASA New Frontiers 
mission launched on an Atlas V 411.  The Origins, Spectral 
Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security-Regolith 
Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) will rendezvous with asteroid Bennu 
in 2018, collect a sample in 2020, and return that sample to 
Earth in September 2023.  This complex mission has required 
a team of well over 1500 people to get this point, with flight 
hardware on its way to Bennu and a ground system and 
operations team controlling it.  Effective systems engineering 
is essential for the success of any endeavor of this scale.   
OSIRIS-REx was competitively selected in May 2011.  The 
Principal Investigator (PI), Dante Lauretta, is at the 
University of Arizona, and he partnered with Lockheed 
Martin (LM) for the flight system development and with 
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) for project 
management, systems engineering, and mission assurance.  
At confirmation, $611 million was budgeted for development 
through phase D outside of launch costs.  The project actually 
spent $566 million through phase D, $45 million under what 
was planned at this point in the project.  The project met all 
the major schedule milestones laid out in the proposal, 
including launch within the 39-day period available to reach 
Bennu. 
This successful performance was not easy.  The team has 
learned a lot about the complexities of operating near and 
contacting a small, unexplored object.  The sampling 
technology and the lidar sensor technology were major 
developments for the project.  And the sheer size of such a 
project presents challenges in coordinating the effort and 
keeping everyone working in the same direction. 
This paper provides the project-level systems engineering 
perspective of the development effort.  It covers here some of 
the key challenges encountered and some of the key 
processes used to get where the project is today.  The focus 
is on useful lessons for future systems engineers, both 
strategies to copy and things to avoid. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170002015 2019-08-31T17:45:17+00:00Z
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2. MISSION OVERVIEW  
This section provides a brief overview of the mission design.  
For more details, see Beshore [1]. 
Design Reference Mission 
The OSIRIS-REx Design Reference Mission (DRM) served 
as the operations concept for the entire mission, launch 
through sample return to Earth.  The DRM aided in the flow 
down of science objectives to requirements at the system, 
subsystem, and lower levels; served as a validation tool for 
use across the project to ensure mission element designs were 
compatible with the operations concept; and provided a 
blueprint for conducting spacecraft operations, science 
operations, and navigation.  The DRM was also used to 
develop scenarios for flight and ground system testing, and it 
served as a kernel from which the science and engineering 
teams developed detailed operations plans and procedures.  
The DRM provided a stable operations concept for 
completing the spacecraft development and testing and for 
operations planning. 
OSIRIS-REx launched on September 8, 2016, and will flyby 
the Earth a year later to get a gravity-assisted delta-v that will 
put the spacecraft in the same orbital plane as Bennu.  
OSIRIS-REx then cruises for 11 months and starts the optical 
search for Bennu in August 2018, marking the beginning of 
the Approach Phase.  Rendezvous occurs in October 2018, 
followed by a month of slow approach to allow the flight 
system to search for moons around Bennu and to refine its 
shape and spin state models.  The spacecraft will spend over 
900 days at Bennu before the first departure opportunity in 
March of 2021. 
Beginning with the Preliminary Survey and Orbital A Phases 
in November and December 2018, respectively, OSIRIS-REx 
lays the foundation for navigating the spacecraft through the 
remainder of the encounter by estimating the mass of Bennu 
and transitioning from star-based to surface landmark-based 
optical navigation for precisely estimating the spacecraft’s 
state relative to the asteroid.  OSIRIS-REx then performs 
comprehensive global mapping of the texture, mineralogy, 
and chemistry of Bennu in the Detailed Survey Phase, 
resolving geological features, revealing its geologic and 
dynamic history, and providing context for the returned 
samples.  The Orbital B Phase, beginning in April 2019, 
establishes the “Safe Home” orbit from which all sorties 
closer to the surface begin.  In the Reconnaissance Phase, the 
instruments document the regolith at candidate sampling sites 
in situ at scales down to the sub-centimeter, providing the 
high-resolution information needed to confirm the presence 
of sampleable regolith and select the primary sample site.  
Following site selection, a sequence of Touch-and-Go (TAG) 
rehearsal steps are conducted to separately demonstrate each 
step in the sample collection sequence prior to sending the 
flight system to the surface for sampling.  In the Sample 
Collection Phase beginning in June of 2020, OSIRIS-REx 
acquires a minimum of 60g of bulk regolith and a separate 26 
cm2 of fine-grained surface material from Bennu.  Additional 
information on TAG is in Lorenz [2]. 
After departing from Bennu, the spacecraft spends two and a 
half years on a ballistic cruise back to Earth.  On September 
24, 2023, the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) lands at the Utah 
Test and Training Range.  From there the SRC will be 
transported to NASA’s Johnson Space Center, where the 
samples are removed and delivered to the OSIRIS-REx 
curation facility. 
Mission Architecture 
Because OSIRIS-REx plans to sample an object that has 
never been approached, the mission must be designed to 
quickly process collected data into knowledge about Bennu, 
then use that knowledge to plan the next step.  The science 
processing aspect of the ground system is tightly coupled to 
the navigation, with the science team delivering shape models 
and other key information related to possible sample sites.  
The DRM described above led directly to the ground and 
flight system architectures.   
Ground System—OSIRIS-REx’s ground system mission 
operations are performed primarily by three elements:  the 
Mission Support Area (MSA), the Flight Dynamics System 
(FDS), and the Science Processing and Operations Center 
(SPOC).  OSIRIS-REx also utilizes NASA’s Deep Space 
Network (DSN) for command uplink and telemetry 
downlink.  The OSIRIS-REx architecture diagram (Figure 1) 
captures the major ground elements and interfaces between 
them.   
The MSA, located at LM’s facility in Littleton, Colorado, 
serves as the spacecraft mission operations activity hub for 
command integration and uplink, maneuver implementation, 
spacecraft health & safety monitoring, and telemetry trending 
and analysis.   
The FDS is responsible for trajectory analysis, orbit 
determination and analysis, and for maneuver and 
verification during the mission.  A joint FDS team of 
personnel from KinetX and NASA’s GSFC are co-located in 
the MSA during the mission.   
The University-of-Arizona-developed SPOC monitors 
instrument telemetry and performs instrument trending 
analyses and health & safety monitoring. OSIRIS-REx 
science and ancillary flight data received by the SPOC is 
“ingested” into the SPOC Database. The SPOC then 
“pipelines” instrument data using algorithms developed by 
OSIRIS-REx instrument providers to produce calibrated and 
validated products to be stored in the database.  Science data 
processing and analysis functions hosted by the SPOC use 
instrument products to generate science data products that are 
integrated to produce maps used for sample-site selection. 
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Figure 1:  OSIRIS-REx Ground System Architecture 
Launch Vehicle—An Atlas V 411 delivered the 2104 kg 
OSIRIS-REx to its targeted outbound trajectory with a C3 of 
29.3 km2/s2.  As the 65th launch on the Atlas V, the interfaces 
were well-defined.  But there are always some features 
unique to the mission.  The OSIRIS-REx team worked early 
with the Launch Services Program (LSP) at the Kennedy 
Space Center, even before the procurement of the launch 
vehicle, to reduce the acoustic spectrum.  The standard 
vehicle environments are designed to envelope all 
configurations, so some configurations will have more 
benign environments.  The team came up with a compromise 
acoustic spectrum that reduced random vibration levels on 
components to a level consistent with some of the key 
heritage components. 
It is not uncommon for launch vehicles to release margin in 
the last few months before launch, after the mission profile 
and any possible changes to the rocket are well defined.  At 
this point in the flow, it is generally too late for the spacecraft 
to use the extra launch mass capability.  OSIRIS-REx 
pursued with LSP an early release of some (150 kg!) of the 
launch vehicle margin.  With the wet mass limit and expected 
dry mass at Critical Design Review (CDR), the spacecraft 
fuel tank had more capacity than we could use.  The extra 
launch mass enabled the project to nearly fill the tank.  The 
change in the CDR time frame gave the team time to adjust 
the test program to accommodate the greater launch mass.  
The extra fuel bought the mission 179 m/s of extra delta V, 
margin that greatly improves the likelihood of success should 
some problem develop during the mission.  
3. FLIGHT SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
LM integrated and tested the flight system at their Waterton, 
CO facility.  GSFC oversaw the development of the five 
science instruments and held the development contract with 
LM.  LM developed the single-fault-tolerant spacecraft bus 
based on several previous planetary missions.  LM also 
developed all of the hardware necessary for acquisition and 
return of the asteroid sample. 
Instruments 
The flight system carries five instruments designed to 
thoroughly map and characterize Bennu prior to the TAG 
event.  Their positions on the spacecraft are shown in  Figure 
2. 
OSIRIS-REx Camera Suite (OCAMS)—The University of 
Arizona designed and built OCAMS.  This instrument 
package includes 3 separate single-string cameras and a fully-
redundant control electronics.  PolyCam is the long-range 
camera, with a 630 mm aperture, f/3.15, and a 0.8-degree 
field of view.  MapCam provides a majority of the mapping 
images, with 4 different color filters, a 125 mm aperture, 
f/3.4, and a 4-degree field of view.  SamCam provides a wide-
angle field of view that includes the sample head during 
TAG.  It will capture 3 images every 5 seconds with a 24 mm 
aperture, f/5.5, and a 22-degree field of view.  Although each 
camera is different, the capabilities overlap enough so that all 
mission objectives can be accomplished with any two of the 
three cameras. 
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Figure 2:  Flight System Instrument Deck 
OSIRIS-REx Thermal Emission Spectrometer (OTES)—
Arizona State University designed and built OTES.  This 
point spectrometer has a 0.46-degree field of view, covering 
5 to 50 µm wavelengths with 0.025 to 2.38 µm (10 cm-1 wave 
number) resolution. 
OSIRIS-REx Visible and near-InfraRed Spectrometer 
(OVIRS)—GSFC designed and built OVIRS.  This point 
spectrometer has a 0.23-degree field of view, covering 0.4 to 
4.2 µm wavelengths with 140 to 410 (λ/Δλ) resolution. 
OSIRIS-REx Laser Altimeter (OLA)—The Canadian Space 
Agency provided this instrument that was designed and built 
by MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd.  OLA is a 
scanning laser altimeter operating at 1064 nm and covering 
ranges from 0.5 to 7 km. 
REgolith X-ray Imaging Spectrometer (REXIS)—The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard College 
students designed and built REXIS.  The primary purpose of 
REXIS was providing an opportunity for students to get 
hands-on experience with space-flight hardware 
development.  The spectrometer covers 0.5 to 7.5 keV, and it 
will provide additional information on the surface 
composition of Bennu. 
Sample Acquisition and Return Assembly (SARA) 
The SARA sub-assembly (shown in Figure 3), designed and 
built by Lockheed Martin, is a simple composite panel 
structure that integrates the Touch-And-Go Sample 
Acquisition Mechanism (TAGSAM) and the SRC into a 
single unit. The SARA panel consists of both electrical and 
mechanical assemblies, since all the harnessing and 
separation components for TAGSAM and SRC are included 
in the panel design.   
By building up the SARA panel early during development, 
the team could perform an early checkout of the full sample 
acquisition and stow operation using simple EGSE, rather 
than requiring expensive Assembly, Test, and Launch 
Operations (ATLO) time. This testing included a full range 
of environments prior to System-level environments to 
confirm no change in performance, even over temperature, 
avoiding the need for expensive MGSE within the system-
level thermal vacuum chamber.  In addition, the SARA 
assembly allowed alignments of the TAGSAM with SRC for 
stowing of the sample  prior to integration on the bus, further 
reducing risk of discovering latent problems late in the ATLO 
flow.   
 
Figure 3:  SARA Assembly and its Location on the Flight 
System 
Brief descriptions of TAGSAM and the SRC follow below.  
For more detailed descriptions of this hardware in its planned 
operation, see Ajluni [3]. 
Touch-And-Go Sample Acquisition Mechanism—The 
TAGSAM sub-assembly was a new development consisting 
of a simple, single-plane, articulating arm.  By utilizing 
single-axis motors, the design remained simple and compact 
while meeting all mission requirements.   
 
Figure 4:  TAG Configuration 
To collect a sample, high-grade nitrogen stored in three 
bottles (to support up to 3 TAG attempts) is injected into the 
asteroid surface at detection of contact with the surface.  
Liberated regolith on the surface of the asteroid is drawn into 
a collection basin via a screening system as the nitrogen vents 
to space, thus collecting the sample.  A simple constant-force 
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spacecraft towards the asteroid in a soft and controlled 
fashion after making contact.  Absolute potentiometers in the 
shoulder and elbow motors are used to track location of the 
arm, along with hardstops located to position the sample head 
along the center of mass of the spacecraft during TAG.  
Figure 4 shows the TAGSAM configuration during TAG. 
Sample Return Capsule—The SRC sub-assembly, shown in 
Figure 5, consists of a structure and avionics that were build-
to-print from the successful Stardust comet sample return 
mission. Minor modifications were required to accommodate 
capture of the TAGSAM Sample Head, but the rest of the 
components required no modification (with exception – see 
Build Challenges).  The SRC contains 3 motors – two for 
latches, and a third to open and close the heatshield to allow 
capture of the Sample Head.  A simple avionics box with G-
Switch and pressure-transducer-based triggers is powered 
shortly before release from the spacecraft, and is used for the 
deploy timing of the parachute (drogue and main chute).  
Batteries provide power throughout the Entry, Descent, and 
Landing sequence, which lasts up to 5.5 hours for the 
mission, starting at the point where the SRC is first powered. 
 
Figure 5:  Sample Return Capsule 
Spacecraft 
The OSIRIS-REx Spacecraft, consisting of the structure and 
general subsystems is leveraged heavily from previous builds 
by LM, with most of the architecture taken directly from the 
Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution mission 
(MAVEN).  The basic architecture consists of an open-bus 
structure with components mounted in a distributed fashion 
to maximize real estate and reduce the need for ballast for 
center-of-mass balancing. To keep cost and schedule risks 
down, attempts to use heritage wherever possible was 
employed across all subsystems.    
Several key components that were able to leverage full build-
to-print from MAVEN include the Reaction Wheels, Inertial 
Measurement Units, Star Trackers, 4-Headed Sun Sensors, 
Thrusters (minus the Low Thrust Rocket Engine Assemblies 
(REA)), Small Deep Space Transponder, Traveling Wave 
Tube Amplifier, and both the Low Gain and High Gain 
Antennas.   
Minor modifications were required for the following 
components and is captured in more detail under the “Build 
Challenges” section):  Command and Data Handling 
(C&DH) Unit, Power Distribution and Data Unit (PDDU), 
and Pyro and Propulsion Unit.  The Solar Arrays are different 
dimensions from MAVEN, but same build structure and solar 
cell technology.  The Spacecraft Batteries are composed of 
the same electronics as MAVEN, but utilize the smaller cell 
sizes from the Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory 
(GRAIL) program, as OSIRIS-REx does not experience any 
eclipses, thus no need for large battery capacity.   
Finally, the OSIRIS-REx program was able to leverage 
hardware and designs from past programs as well, which 
include items like the Solar Array Two-Axis Gimbal, which 
was a minor modification from the units on Mars Odyssey, 
the 2-Headed Sun Sensors which are build-to-print from 
Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO), the Low Thrust 
REA’s, which are build-to-print from Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellite R (GOES-R), and the 
Medium Gain Antenna, which was a minor modification 
from the unit used on the Phoenix Mars Lander.   
Figure 6 shows the distributed nature of the components 
about the bus. 
 
Figure 6:  OSIRIS-REx Spacecraft 
However, not all components could be leveraged from past 
programs. The OSIRIS-REx mission, with requirements to 
lightly touch an asteroid to collect a sample, drove some new 
development.  This includes, in addition to the previously 
described TAGSAM, the mission-developed Guidance, 
Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Lidars, TAG Cameras 
(TAGCAMS), Natural Feature Tracking (NFT) Autonomy, 
and a Propellant Management Device (PMD). 
GN&C lidar—While lidar applications in-space are not new, 
ranging against a very low albedo surface over a large range 
at potentially extreme angles drove a significant new 
development effort for the lidar system selected.  The long 
duration operations requirements to support TAG after 4.5 
years required more stringent hermetic sealing than heritage 
units, along with a need for higher radiation tolerant parts.   
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TAGCAMS—During early development for the program, it 
became apparent that navigation about a small body would 
be tricky.  In addition, due to technical risks being raised 
about the complexities of the lidar system, an optical back-up 
to the GN&C lidar was desired (see Autonomous Docking 
under Design Challenges for more information).  To that 
extent, optical cameras were added to the Flight System that 
could resolve both features on the surface of the asteroid 
while also acquiring stars in the same frame, all with short 
integration times.  In the end, unique optical coatings were 
developed for the camera lens to ensure no issues.   
NFT Autonomy—In addition to the Optical Navigation 
capabilities described above, the program desired a full 
autonomous back-up to the GN&C Lidar for performing 
TAG operations.  Leveraged from past work on XSS-11, the 
program was able to develop a NFT capability that uses the 
TAGCAMS camera system to look for known features on the 
surface of Bennu (boulders, craters, etc). The system relies 
on early observations of the asteroid via the existing science 
campaign to build up a shape model of the surface of Bennu.  
Once the shape model is developed, reference features are 
defined and commanded back to the Spacecraft.  The Flight 
System then uses the features to navigate during TAG. 
Due to the processor intensive operation of parsing through 
images looking for features in real-time, care had to be given 
to ensure task priorities were configured correctly to avoid 
starving of higher priority tasks.  By utilizing time stamping 
and state propagation, the system can take more time to 
process images if required, then apply the propagated state to 
determine the Flight-System’s current location.  During 
TAG, two predefined burns can be adjusted autonomously by 
Flight Software based on the propagated state from NFT.  
Bounds are placed on the allowable size of maneuver 
adjustments, thus if NFT shows that the spacecraft is too far 
off course, the Flight System can back away and return to 
orbit to allow ground to assess the situation.   
PMD—Due to the pogo nature of the TAG operation, the 
Spacecraft needed to be able to perform maneuvers in both 
the +Z and –Z directions with minimal time between 
maneuvers.  The size of the tank precluded the use of a 
bladder-type system, thus a unique fuel trap was integrated 
into the PMD to ensure propellant would be available during 
the back-away maneuver from the asteroid.  The trap was 
sized to ensure the worst-case number and size of burns 
required to support TAG could be accommodated, with 2x 
margin above and beyond that. 
4. DESIGN CHALLENGES 
Unknown Asteroid Environment 
The unexplored nature of Bennu presented some engineering 
design challenges.  The instruments which will perform the 
early reconnaissance of the asteroid must handle the full 
range of surface brightness.  For the cameras, a simple 
adjustment of the exposure times will compensate, although 
longer exposure times will drive the attitude control stability.  
And the mission requires enough dynamic range to support a 
reasonable range of surface brightness in a single image.  The 
lidars, on the other hand, must have the proper gain control 
and protection to handle sudden reflective locations. 
To contact the surface and collect the required sample, other 
characteristics of Bennu’s surface come in to play.  The grain 
size must be small enough to ingest into the sample head.  The 
surface must be smooth enough to get proper contact.  The 
system must be able to handle the range of possible surface 
strengths.  And the planned trajectory must take into 
consideration variations in the gravity field as the flight 
system approaches the surface. 
Early on, the project developed a “Design Reference 
Asteroid” (DRA) [4] based on the most up-to-date science 
data available.  The science team made extensive 
observations of Bennu on its close approaches to the Earth in 
2005 and 2011, and that data provided the basis for the DRA.  
The science team captured in the DRA all the parameters 
which were needed by the engineering team, with a best-
estimate and an expected range for each.  Examples of 
parameters include the orbital elements, size, the spin rate, 
photometric properties, thermal properties, and surface 
mechanical properties.  Clearly, there is significant 
uncertainty in some of these parameters, but the infrared, 
radar, and optical observations of Bennu did provide some 
information.  Also, other asteroids that have been visited, like 
Itokawa, provide some bounding of the problem.  The 
engineering team recognized throughout development that 
the team could not place requirements on Bennu, but the 
engineers have placed requirements on the system to handle 
the expected range of environments at Bennu with margin.  
The collaboration between the science team and the 
engineering team in the development of the DRA enabled the 
project to clearly capture the knowns and unknowns, so the 
engineering team knew where best to apply the margin, 
maximizing the chance of success.  
Significant Small Forces 
Unlike a planetary orbital environment where the planet’s 
gravity is by far the dominant force acting on the spacecraft, 
the “small forces” acting on the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft are 
of comparable magnitude to the asteroid’s gravity, so much 
so that the accuracy with which the accelerations from these 
forces can be modeled determines how accurately the 
spacecraft’s future orbital state can be predicted.  Figure 7 
shows the magnitude of these small forces relative to Bennu’s 
gravity.  In the Preliminary Survey Phase, the acceleration 
from the solar radiation pressure exceeds that due to Bennu’s 
gravity, and during the Orbital A Phase the oblate shape of 
Bennu comes into play. 
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Figure 7:  Small Force Accelerations Relative to Bennu's Gravity (central body) 
Another small force acting to perturb the spacecraft’s 
trajectory around Bennu is the residual delta-v from 
spacecraft thruster firings to unload system momentum.  The 
magnitude and frequency of these momentum unload events 
must be carefully controlled, and the residual delta-v 
accurately modeled and factored into orbit determination 
solutions to maintain orbit and accurately predict the 
spacecraft’s future state for the small delta-v maneuvers 
needed around Bennu for science observation targeting. 
Autonomous “Docking” with a Natural Target 
With a one-way light time of up to 18 minutes, spacecraft 
operations during the TAG execution needed to be 
completely autonomous.  And with an expectation from the 
science side of being able to provide a safe landing ellipse of 
only 25 meters in diameter, significant effort early in the 
project design went into ensuring the spacecraft would 
remain safe throughout the TAG operation with no ground-
in-the-loop interaction. As an example, one quick change was 
to articulate the arrays back away from the surface to add 
clearance, as the Spacecraft could tip by up to 45 degrees 
during ground interactions while collecting the sample.  
Another change removed large back-away thrusters that had 
risk of kicking up significant regolith from the surface, and 
instead using the smaller attitude control thrusters.  
However, the bulk of the early focus was placed on how to 
get to the surface successfully. The baseline concept for 
performing TAG utilizes just a lidar system, and relies on an 
expected range and rate to the asteroid as the Flight System 
traverses across the surface.  By starting ranging before ever 
even crossing the limb of the asteroid, the Flight System is 
able to detect the limb of the asteroid as a starting reference 
point.  Then, using a pre-defined range/rate corridor, the 
Flight System is able to continue to track the progression over 
the surface until finally achieving a spot directly over the 
landing ellipse, where it then starts the slow decent to the 
surface.  Analyses by the navigation and GN&C groups of all 
possible error sources was factored into the Range/Rate 
corridor checks to ensure no false trips, while guaranteeing 
spacecraft safety.  The end result during early development 
was a very robust system that could detect and respond to a 
variety of faults, while ensuring the highest likelihood of 
collecting a pristine sample.  
Unfortunately, delays in the development of the GN&C Lidar 
forced the team to look at alternative methods to safely get to 
the surface.  After pulling together a trade, alternative options 
which included radar, other lidar sources, and even pure time-
based maneuver solutions, a selection was made to go with 
NFT. The robust optical navigation system is able to use 
features on the surface of the asteroid (rocks, craters, etc) to 
determine position and make adjustments as needed.  Similar 
to the lidar range/rate corridor solution, NFT required a new 
set of fault protection to monitor the health of the camera 
system, as well as track key parameters to ensure no spoofing 
of NFT that would result in a mission failure.  Using 
simulated asteroid surface models, NFT has proven to be 
robust, as long as the asteroid surface has features that can be 
tracked.   
Instrument Accommodation 
In order to win a New Frontiers mission, the design must 
incorporate significant flight heritage to reduce the risk of 
development.  Existing designs for instruments and the 
spacecraft must be adjusted somewhat to accommodate 
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difference from the past applications.  The LM spacecraft was 
designed with this fact in mind.  All of the instruments 
interface through a single circuit card design, with science 
data storage available right on the card.  Any instrument-
unique changes tend to be contained within this hardware and 
its associated software, leaving the rest of the spacecraft bus 
avionics relatively untouched.  But there were some areas that 
were not fully envisioned by the original designers of the LM 
spacecraft architecture. 
A topic that came up early and continued to follow the 
instruments was sun avoidance.  The instruments do not 
include aperture covers, and some of the imagers can be 
damaged by relatively short exposure to the sun, so the 
spacecraft GN&C system, combined with ground planning of 
observations, must avoid staring directly at the sun.  The 
system includes sun sensors facing in the direction of the 
instrument boresights to trigger a safing response should the 
spacecraft attitude deviate from plan.  The safe mode includes 
a slow rotation to guarantee that the boresights will not dwell 
on the sun.  Because the instruments are pointed along the 
primary thrust axis of the launch vehicle, the sun avoidance 
also put some constraints on the launch window.  Future 
missions should better consider the implications of sun 
avoidance during phase A, when the structure and the mission 
architecture are still flexible. 
Although the spacecraft bus has significant ability to 
autonomously detect and react to anomalies, fault protection 
for the instruments was largely assumed to be within the 
instruments themselves.  This does reduce the interface 
burden, but it also results in significant duplication of effort 
across the instruments.  Although thresholds can be easily 
modified late in development, the logic of safing checks is 
hard coded within the spacecraft software.  If the logic were 
more easily configured, the spacecraft team could take on the 
instrument safing checks, reduce the cost of instrument 
software development, and improve the overall reliability and 
system-level visibility of instrument safing. 
5. BUILD CHALLENGES  
New Technology 
The OSIRIS-REx flight system leverages heritage hardware 
and software, proven test campaigns and experienced 
personnel to ensure mission success.  The OSIRIS-REx flight 
system builds on proven LM experience and uses established 
hardware, software, technology, and processes from Stardust, 
MAVEN, Juno, GRAIL, Odyssey, and MRO and lessons 
learned from twelve interplanetary missions launched by LM 
in the last seventeen years.   
With that said, to meet the unique aspects of the OSIRIS-REx 
mission, there have been some flight system new 
technologies that did require extra oversight and proper 
mitigation of risk to get them fully developed and ready to 
support the OSIRIS-REx mission.  As part of the overall 
OSIRIS-REx process, a full new-technology assessment was 
performed, to ensure proper steps were taken to implement 
these new technologies, as well as ensure the proper 
mitigation of risk.   
One of the initial steps that system engineering did, with 
support/inputs from the subsystems, was the identification of 
new technologies.  This evaluation and identification is a 
critical system engineering process, to ensure that those areas 
with build challenges, do have the necessary maturation plans 
in place, the necessary risks identified/tracked, and the 
necessary resources in place to support these new technology 
developments.  To ensure the new technologies on the 
OSIRIS-REx program also got enough higher level oversight, 
an independent review team was organized to review those 
program “hot spots” where new technologies may exist, and 
to confirm the identification of a new technology.  This new 
technology would then go through a formal process of risk 
burn-down, with maturation plans developed, along with a 
review of these plans with an executive level team review, to 
ensure the program has all of the plans/resources in place to 
execute the development and implementation of these new 
technologies.  Figure 8 summarizes from where the key 
heritage components were leveraged (with New/MAVEN 
leverage shown as a separate block since it was the most 
recent interplanetary mission launched, prior to OSIRIS-REx 
launch). 
The flight system new technologies identified for OSIRIS-
REx were:  GN&C Lidar, NFT, TAGSAM, and TAGCAMS.  
Here is a summary of each new technology and the 
challenges experienced during the developments: 
GN&C Lidar—Advanced Scientific Corporation (ASC) 
provided a modified commercial lidar as OSIRIS-REx’s 
RexEye space-rated GN&C lidar.  The laser was defined by 
the program as new technology with TRL-6 achieved at 
Mission PDR in March 2013.  OSIRIS-REx requires this 
GN&C lidar as the prime approach for successfully 
performing TAG event.   OSIRIS-REx did a trade on other 
proximity sensors (range finder, scanning lidar, flash lidar) 
and the ASC lidar was deemed the lowest risk.  The GNC 
lidar, at the highest level, supports not only providing range 
measurements during the TAG event itself to support the on-
board navigation, but also during the reconnaissance passes, 
which are performed before TAG to characterize the TAG 
site, providing range measurements for PolyCam focusing.  
The transition from a short-duration, low-Earth commercial 
product to a long-duration planetary application demanded a 
more robust device and a laser life test.  The total 
development associated with the lidar included the hardware 
development, qualification and delivery, the GNC algorithm 
development, fault protection updates, and thermal control 
and overall design considerations.  
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Figure 8:  Heritage Assessment 
The early development work on the laser module uncovered 
several issues.  The first life-test unit failed early due to 
contamination that was traced to a heater.  The hermetic 
package of the laser module was identified as a potential 
problem, but it passed its early testing, then later units 
showed excessive leaking.  This problem resulted in a 
redesign of the laser module package.   
Problems continued to plague the development as the 
complete lidar assembly came together.  The first random 
vibration test caused foreign debris to show up on the inside 
of the laser window, pointing out the need for better 
contamination control during assembly of the lidar.  The 
diffuser wheel position changed after testing, identifying an 
error in the mechanical design.  And the shock testing showed 
an unexpected sensitivity.  Overall, the problems were the 
type one would expect during the development of new flight 
hardware. 
LM brought in many technical experts across the various 
technical fields from both LM and GSFC to help resolve 
these design challenges.  This included electrical 
engineering, laser transmitter module experts, contamination 
control, optical, sensor module delamination experts, test 
subject matter experts and fellow, failure analysis labs and 
the large Space Operation Simulation Center support for end-
to-end testing in a flight like environment.   
Additionally, the project implemented development of NFT 
as a back-up navigation scheme for TAG.  See below for 
more details on NFT. 
Challenging developments provide many lessons.  Here are 
the main lessons from the lidar development: (1) ensure a 
conforming prototype hardware test bed is available (and 
configuration controlled) throughout program; (2) tailor 
oversight methodology consistent with the vendor 
capabilities and limitations; (3) establish good control of 
hardware/software baselines, test procedure documentation, 
and GSE systems; (4) apply increased cost and schedule 
margin for new developments with small companies. 
In the end, with strong system engineering oversight and 
strong LM/GSFC oversight of the GN&C lidar vendor, the 
team successfully delivered and integrated onto the flight 
system two fully verified flight GN&C lidars, with a fully 
qualified design. 
Natural Feature Tracking (NFT)—LM developed and 
demonstrated NFT under Internal Research and Development 
(IRAD), with a PDR successfully completed in May 2013.  
OSIRIS-REx utilizes the redundant Malin NavCams (part of 
TAGCAMS) and LM IRAD based software to mitigate 
GN&C lidar risk.  This NFT alternate technology was 
implemented as risk reduction to the GN&C lidar (risk of 
unexpected GNC lidar performance at Bennu).  Since NFT 
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was not added until after mission CDR, the challenge was the 
integration and test of this optical image processing and 
software solution, and the associated fault protection, on 
schedule.  The final design and implementation demonstrated 
a design that met full performance with margins in all key 
areas—FSW processing, memory, through-put and overall 
TAG footprint. 
TAGSAM—OSIRIS-REx is flying TAGSAM, a single-plane 
motion arm, complete with the TAGSAM head that 
fluidizes/captures Bennu regolith.  This TAGSAM design 
evolved over ~10 years, with hundreds of hours of testing 
completed (full TRL-6 completed at Mission PDR in March 
2013.  The TAG-based sampling approach selected for 
OSIRIS-REx is the result of over ten years of LM IRAD 
efforts. Inherent to this effort were exhaustive trade studies 
comparing landed and TAG strategies. Landing a S/C on a 
small body requires anchoring devices to stabilize the S/C, 
which is difficult because of the likelihood of low-strength 
regolith. Negating bounce upon landing requires hold-down 
thrusters, resulting in sample contamination.  In addition, 
communication dropout is inevitable due to terrain masking, 
unfavorable attitude, and rapid day/night cycling. OSIRIS-
REx eliminates these risks by using a short-duration contact 
TAG for sampling.   
The team studied many different sample collection 
techniques, including sticky pads, claw and clamshell 
samplers, drive tubes, augers, coring drills, scoops, rakes, and 
gas-stimulated sampling. Gas stimulation is used because it 
minimizes moving parts, functions without motors during 
sampling, and keeps the sample pristine.  The effectiveness 
and simplicity of the TAGSAM approach was initially 
verified through five years of intense development, including 
the production of five engineering development units, which 
have been used in an extensive test program.   
OSIRIS-REx Sample Return Mission requires TAGSAM.   
GN2 bottles are utilized to fluidize regolith and TAGSAM 
head then captures regolith and traps it, utilizing a Mylar flap.  
LM Denver designed and manufactured TAGSAM and 
completed a full qualification program and flight acceptance 
program completed for TAGSAM flight head.  Moreover, the 
approach to confirm the successful collection of the sample, 
once the S/C is safely away from Bennu, is achieved through 
a Cassini heritage algorithm for identifying S/C inertia 
/change in inertia, before and after sample collection. 
TAGCAMS—Modified Malin Space Science Systems 
(MSSS) camera system utilizes hardware from MSSS 
modular imaging system product line.  The TAGCAMS 
cameras use the C50 (5 Mpixel) camera body.  TAGCAMS 
was at TRL-7 (System prototype demo in space environment) 
upon selection of this hardware for the OSIRIS-REx mission.  
OSIRIS-REx utilizes redundant MSSS NavCams (part of 
TAGCAMS) for both NFT and ground-based Optical 
Navigation inputs (the ground based navigation required 
wide FOV camera system as well).  As a note, LM Space 
System Company has flown MSSS camera systems 
previously, but the challenge was OSIRIS-REx’s critical uses 
of this camera system for autonomous navigation.  The 
heritage of this camera system includes a classified mission, 
the MSL rovers, and the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter.   
In the end, by taking a very proactive approach at identifying 
the new technologies, and then developing plans to mature 
these new technologies into successful design and 
implementations, all of the new technologies on OSIRIS-REx 
were successfully designed, built, tested and integrated into 
the OSIRIS-REx flight system. 
Heritage 
As already outlined above, the OSIRIS-REx flight system 
builds on lessons learned from twelve interplanetary missions 
launched by LM in the last seventeen years.  These lessons 
learned include: 
 Perform a set of trades early looking at heritage that 
already exists to determine if it will meet the mission 
requirements; heritage is only value-added if it meets the 
requirements. However, look at opportunities where the 
mission design is flexible where requirements can be 
modified to fit within heritage capabilities.  Often, 
requirements can be reworked that result in negligible 
impact to the L1 and L2 science requirements, while 
reducing cost and schedule risk by fitting within existing 
heritage designs and analyses.  The OSIRIS-REx 
structure and the TAGSAM sample head were designed 
around the Stardust sample return capsule.  The mission 
was designed around the heritage spacecraft capabilities. 
 Stick with heritage that matches the mission.  Trying 
to force fit heritage hardware causes cost overruns and 
increases risk.  OSIRIS-REx made these decisions early. 
 Scrutinize heritage hardware to guarantee it meets 
mission requirements, including environments (this 
includes full heritage reviews, prior to incorporation into 
the design).  OSIRIS-REx held two weeks of heritage 
reviews in July 2012, shortly after the Mission Definition 
Review. 
 Design for flight hardware testability. Building on 
planetary experience and incorporating recent lessons 
learned, the team has designed a systematic, thorough, 
and fully traceable component and system assembly, 
verification, and validation program.  
 Provide robust power and telecom margins.  Robust 
margins provide flexibility during operations.  
With a Spacecraft system that is heavily tied to heritage 
architectures, there is added risk for any change.  Full 
implications of change are not obvious to those who did not 
design the component.  This was seen in a couple areas during 
development that led to some late discoveries during the build 
of the OSIRIS-REx Spacecraft.  The following are some 
examples from the Spacecraft where heritage played a role, 
both good and bad.   
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Channelization—One of the more frustrating examples where 
heritage added risk is an error introduced into the 
channelization layout for the spacecraft that was not 
discovered until initial integration of components on the 
spacecraft.  Following the heritage mantra, the harness 
subsystem used the same pin-outs for the avionics hardware 
as was used for previous builds, and was able to complete 
their design and drawing releases very early in the 
development phase for the program.  However, due to some 
card modifications (see the “DTCI” section below), the 
Avionics team included a couple pin changes to increase 
robustness in the card.  While the card changes were 
understood and fully vetted through appropriate Change 
Requests, with the harness drawings already released, the 
incorporation of the pin-out changes was not caught during 
harness manufacturing. During initial signal checkouts prior 
to mate of components, the discrepancy was discovered and 
corrected, but resulted in the loss of a couple days in ATLO 
to perform the modifications real-time.  While use of heritage 
saved significant amount of time during the development 
phase, care must be given to ensure the proper reviews are 
still held later in the flow to ensure changes are fully captured 
and implemented correctly.   
Power Modeling—Another area where heritage caused 
problems was in the modeling of the Power subsystem.  For 
the heritage missions to OSIRIS-REx, the variation of 
incoming power is fairly stable for any given phase of the 
mission, thus the Power Model could be configured to 
simulate a single worst-case moment-in-time.  For OSIRIS-
REx however, the mission profile while at the asteroid span 
a solar range from 0.89AU to 1.4AU, with a wide variety of 
load cases occurring at different times.  Taking the worst-case 
load for science observations planned to occur at 0.89AU 
would break the 1.4AU scenario if the heritage approach was 
used. Furthermore, huge changes in thermal states across the 
wide solar range change and various instrument 
configurations added to the challenge.  To mitigate this, the 
model was updated to calculate the available power on a day-
by-day basis throughout the mission.  The initial attempts to 
use the heritage model and phase it to work for a 7.1 year 
period proved cumbersome, with the model taking multiple 
minutes to re-calculate when updates were required.  In the 
end, new tools were created to optimize the model, thus 
getting calculation times down to under a minute per change.  
In this case, heritage was not helpful, and ended up creating 
extra work for the team compared to just starting from scratch 
at the beginning.   
Data, Telemetry, and Command Interface (DTCI) Card—
The C&DH DTCI is the payload interface card for the 
OSIRIS-REx spacecraft and heritage missions.  The card 
contains the interfaces for not only the command and data 
interfaces to the instruments, but also the data storage 
capabilities, and provides some clear examples of the pitfalls 
associated with making “minor changes” to heritage 
hardware.   
Where all the other C&DH cards interface with other heritage 
components (GN&C, Prop, Thermal, Telecom, etc), the 
DTCI card is used to communicate with instruments, which 
are typically unique for each mission.  Thus, the design for 
the DTCI often needs to be tweaked to accommodate changes 
to payload interfaces or protocols.  On OSIRIS-REx, the 
interfaces happened to align perfectly with MAVEN, and 
thus no changes looked to be required.  The only open item 
from MAVEN involved some very minor memory corruption 
errors at extreme temperatures.  These were considered a 
non-issue for the MAVEN program, but could cause 
problems on OSIRIS-REx due to operation within those 
temperature regimes.  The short-burst nature of the science 
collection means that even minor memory corruptions will 
cause large perturbations to the data return.  Thus, the 
decision was made early-on to fix the memory corruption 
errors, which MAVEN had tracked to requiring some simple 
rerouting of signals in the Printed Wiring Board.   
Since the card was being modified for the memory corruption 
errors, the team decided to add robustness to the card pin-outs 
in the process.  This was seen as a “free” change since it only 
involved moving around signals (no additions or 
subtractions), and ultimately led to the Channelization errors 
described above.  Of bigger concern though, was that 
rerouting of the signals to fix the memory corruption did not 
actually fix the problem – indeed, the corruptions were worse 
after making the change.  After several months of 
investigation, the issue was traced down to shifts in the timing 
circuit and drive current circuits that had been masked with 
the MAVEN implementation.  The fix required minor 
modifications to all the DTCI boards, which were already 
installed on the Spacecraft and had gone through the initial 
dynamic environment testing at the System Level.  The 
C&DHs had to be removed from the Spacecraft and penalty 
testing performed.  The project experienced a significant 
amount of work, all for something that could have been 
resolved by optimizing the thermal design to stay out of the 
temperature regimes of concern, thus allowing the card to 
stay Build-to-Print from MAVEN.   
Not that full Build-to-Print from MAVEN would have been 
without its own issues.  One other late discovery with the 
DTCI card wasn’t discovered until the first System 
Verification Test (SVT) on the Spacecraft running multiple 
instruments simultaneously.  While the DTCI card was 
designed to handle simultaneous data transfers from 
instruments, the heritage card-level test program only 
simulated a single type of data interface with data always 
coming in 32-bit aligned.  On OSIRIS-REx, multiple 
instruments transferred data without 32-bit buffering, thus 
requiring the DTCI card to handle this data buffering.  
Performing the buffering on one stream of data proved a non-
issue, while multiple instruments proved problematic.  Since 
the obvious solution would have required a FPGA change to 
the board late in the ATLO flow, the team sought alternatives. 
The final solution involved moving around instrument 
interfaces between the DTCI cards to ensure no simultaneous 
operations required 32-bit buffering.   This required breaking 
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into the fully EMI-wrapped harness in the middle of system-
level environments to make the change.  The lesson here is 
that when using heritage components, the heritage test 
program should be scrubbed to ensure applicability to the 
program requirements.   
Housekeeping Power Supply (HKPS) Card—The HKPS card 
is an example where heritage can be very helpful, even from 
unexpected sources.  On MAVEN, the PDDU utilizes a High-
Efficiency Power Supply (HEPS) board to provide secondary 
power for the box.  The HEPS has heritage back to the 01’ 
Mars Odyssey days, where power constraints required a 
power supply design with minimal internal losses to save 
every watt possible.  After the development of the HEPS, 
future programs continued to use that design, as that became 
the new “heritage”.  The HEPS card was fantastic at what it 
was required to do, but also very expensive to manufacture.   
Early during development on OSIRIS-REx, a cost 
opportunity was investigated to reduce the high 
manufacturing costs for the HEPS. Power was not a 
constraint on OSIRIS-REx, thus there was no need for a 
“high-efficiency” board.  A trade was performed to look for 
other solutions, and the outcome pointed to resurrecting the 
HEPS pre-cursor, the HKPS board, which sacrificed 
efficiency for simplicity.  The HKPS was a proven design, 
used on past programs including Stardust and Spitzer Space 
Telescope.   
The original HKPS design required minimal modification for 
parts obsolescence, and was manufactured at a fraction of the 
cost for a HEPS.  In addition, the card consumed less than 
2W more compared to the HEPS due to increased efficiencies 
in the piece-parts.  All-in-all, the HKPS has proven to be a 
very successful implementation of heritage, even from 
programs over 15 years ago. 
Sample Return Capsule—While the HKPS proved to be a 
highly-successful implementation of old heritage, the SRC 
shows that extremely old heritage has its own level of pitfalls 
that need to be considered early in the development phase.   
The SRC was originally designed for Stardust starting in 
1991, with most of the design details completing in 1994 – 
still over 20 years prior to the OSIRIS-REx development.  
This alone proved the most significant challenge, for the 
following reasons: 
 Microsoft is NOT backwards compatible – Going 
back one or two versions of Word and Excel may be 
achievable with Microsoft, but going back 20+ years 
poses a challenge.  Special servers had to be setup that 
could run old 2000 versions of Microsoft just to allow 
import of heritage test reports, analyses, and data 
systems.  Simple items like extracting original 
channelization for the SRC turned into tedious tasks of 
digging through files with name length limitations.  And 
while hardcopies existed of all the data, finding exactly 
what you needed from 20+ year old archives is not a 
simple task. 
 Hardcopies, while nice to retain, only tell part of the 
story – Stardust did a great job documenting everything, 
which was great… if you could find the data.  Modern 
conveniences of being able to digitally search through a 
server for particular items is not possible when digging 
through boxes of drawings, even when scanned and 
converted to pdf.  2000+ pages of hardcopy 
documentation requires significant effort to sort through.   
 Finding resources from Stardust days proved 
difficult – As could be expected, few of the original 
designers from the Stardust era are still around, and those 
that are have little recollection of the finer details of the 
design.   
Beyond the general age of the Stardust SRC design, another 
factor that proved challenging was the change in engineering 
design and analysis expectations.  Analyses and tests 
performed back in the “Better, Faster, Cheaper” days do not 
meet the rigor expected in today’s low-risk aerospace 
industry.  Significant effort was required to rework analyses 
and perform new testing that wasn’t required back during the 
Stardust era, something that wasn’t fully factored into the 
initial heritage assessment.     
Note that the extra testing was not without value – two issues 
were uncovered during retest activities that may have been a 
problem for OSIRIS-REx if only the heritage test programs 
had been relied upon. The first revolved around the shock 
environment for the SRC Avionics Unit, specifically during 
the mortar firing to release the drogue parachute.  On 
Stardust, the analysis showed that this was not a significant 
shock source due to the number of joints separating the 
parachute from the Avionics Unit.  However, updated 
analyses and shock testing showed that the pressure wave 
from the mortar firing was able to directly interact with the 
SRC Avionics Deck, which produced a shock event 10x 
higher than expected.  The Stardust shock isolation system 
was not sufficient to account for the increased shock, and 
needed to be enhanced.  A new shock isolation system 
utilizing wire-rope units was developed to fit within the tight 
volume constraints of the SRC.  The increased size of the 
shock isolation system required rebuild of the harnesses to 
account for the additional standoff heights, and special back 
shells utilized to ensure clearances with the heat shield hinge 
line.   
The other issue uncovered in the additional testing involved 
the parachute.  During a drop test, the Stardust heritage 
design was shown to have the cut-cord potentially bind in the 
bridle system, which would have resulted in failure to deploy 
the main parachute.  An improved cut-cord system was 
implemented to ensure hang-ups of the cut-cord would be 
impossible, however, this introduced a single-point-failure if 
both primary and redundant cutters happened to execute 
simultaneously.  Attempts to mitigate the SPF in the Avionics 
design proved problematic, with testing showing that there 
was a 1 in 20 chance of getting the cutters to release within 
the window of vulnerability.  Based on the test data, the 
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parachute design was modified again to remove the SPF from 
the design completely. 
Operations Processes—Another example of the adaptation 
of heritage for OSIRIS-REx is in the area of mission 
operations processes.  Because of the challenges in predicting 
the spacecraft’s future state due to the complex small force 
environment, spacecraft commands for activities like 
maneuvers and science observations that depend on those 
predictions must be updated shortly before execution to take 
advantage of the most recent navigation tracking information 
possible.  In fact, a requirement was levied on the system to 
be capable of updating maneuver and observation parameters 
on the spacecraft within 24 hours of the activity execution.  
Heritage mostly-manual operations processes and software 
tools could not complete the tasks of preparing, reviewing, 
testing, and uplink of these “late updates” within the 24 hour 
window.  This resulted in the automation of many of the 
heritage processes and tools used to develop and test late 
update command products.  For example, the tool used to 
determine if any spacecraft pointing constraints are violated 
by a late-updated science observation design was modified to 
perform this checking autonomously. 
Complex Subassemblies 
While any complex system will experience its share of 
discoveries along the way, the TAGSAM and SRC 
subassemblies provide some interesting examples of note.   
Although obvious after the fact, one key aspect of both the 
TAGSAM and SRC subassemblies is that, while mostly 
mechanical in nature, they contain electrical components.  
However, the responsible engineers for both subsystems were 
Mechanical Engineers by trade, and did not understand the 
full implications of some of their decisions on the electrical 
portion as the design matured.  This caused disconnects 
between items like channelization and default sensor states 
that were not caught until very late in the development phase. 
One example of this was the wiring output to the phases of 
the motors, which were consistently backwards from how the 
avionics and FSW had been instantiated.  Although 
documentation from both sides showed the design, because 
of the lack of electrical oversight, the significance was missed 
during data reviews.  A similar issue arose with the wiring of 
the micro-switches, resulting in the state of the switches 
being ambiguous until the TAGSAM arm is deployed and the 
SRC is initially opened. In hindsight, any subassemblies that 
contain both mechanical and electrical components should 
have someone with more of a systems perspective leading the 
effort to ensure compatibility.   
Another area where complexities of the subassembly caused 
consternation involved the pogo force during TAG.  Constant 
force springs were sized based off the analysis to provide a 
soft push without introducing stresses in the shoulder and 
elbow joints of the arm.  However, after initial testing of the 
actual force, it was discovered to be ~20% higher than 
expected. The cause was traced to the harness running down 
for the nitrogen bottles and wrist motor, which was stiffer 
than originally expected.  Even though a model harness had 
been created to check stiffness for the model early in 
development, the flight harness contained extra shielding and 
tighter overwraps, resulting in the extra stiffness.   
The final aspect of the TAGSAM design that proved 
challenging involved Electro-Static Discharge (ESD) 
mitigation. Analyses performed early in development 
showed that the asteroid could have a 100V differential 
compared to the Spacecraft at time of TAG.  Modeling of the 
effects of this on the Spacecraft showed that this was a 
sufficient bump of the ground plane to potentially cause a 
reset of the processor, which would be catastrophic at time of 
contact.  The mitigation was intended to be simple – isolate 
the TAGSAM arm from the Spacecraft with a bleed resistor 
to slowly discharge any voltage spike.  However, due to the 
TAGSAM arm containing both conductive blankets and 
harnessing, the implementation proved harder than expected.  
The end result was to fully isolate the harness shields at both 
ends, as well as completely isolate the TAGSAM blankets 
from the Spacecraft at the shoulder interface. 
Instrument Interfaces 
Significant work was performed very early on the program to 
fully define and lockdown the instrument electrical and 
software interfaces to ensure full compatibility with the 
spacecraft avionics and flight software.  Since many of the 
instruments were common with heritage programs built on 
the same architecture, little modification was required on 
either side of the interface to accommodate the vast array of 
payload designs.  Indeed, due to the confidence in the early 
interface definition work, the program was able to realize 
early cost savings by deleting costly spacecraft simulation 
hardware, in lieu of delaying integration to the much higher 
fidelity Spacecraft Test Lab.   
Where the electrical and software interfaces were worked 
heavily, the mechanical interfaces followed a more 
traditional pace, and as such, did experience some late 
discoveries on the program.  Specifically, instruments that 
contained multiple components spread about the spacecraft 
with interconnecting harnesses held the largest room for 
error.  With instrument harnesses manufactured by the 
individual payload teams, errors arose between the mock-ups 
and the assumptions of the spacecraft configuration at the 
various centers. Of particular note was a late discovery that 
multiple instruments, as well as the spacecraft, made an 
assumption that no other users required access through a 
particular pass-through in the decking. Each party had 
confirmed that their harness bundle easily fit, but during 
integration, it was quickly discovered that not all the 
connectors could fit through the hole as it filled with bundles. 
This forced increasing the hole’s diameter at time of harness 
installation on the spacecraft to accommodate all the users. 
Significant effort would have been prevented with better 
modeling of the harness routing from all parties, including 
proper harness diameters after all shielding is included.  In 
addition, ensuring that each build center was constantly 
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aware of changes, no matter how minor, would have avoided 
late discoveries at time of integration.  
One other instrument interface issue that showed up late in 
the build of the flight system was sensitivity of OTES to 
many different sources of mechanical noise.  The team 
captured a requirement on the mechanical sensitivity at a 
particular frequency, but the instrument turned out to be 
sensitive to other sources at other frequencies, including 
vibrations produced the Miniature Inertial Measurement Unit 
(MIMU) and by whistling in the purge system.  The MIMU 
interaction was only found during concurrent operations of 
OTES with the MIMU several months after integration.  
Future missions should be sure to operate all spacecraft 
components with the instruments shortly after they are 
integrated.  A slight adjustment of the OTES mirror drive 
table took the MIMU vibration out of its band of operation. 
Mass and Center-of-Mass (CM) Tracking 
While OSIRIS-REx had very healthy mass margins 
throughout the program, CM knowledge on the mission was 
critical as determination of the sample mass was 
accomplished via detecting the change in inertia during a spin 
of the Spacecraft.  Having a CM offset from the center of the 
fuel tank could lead to fuel slosh, which would be disastrous 
when trying to detect as low as 60g of sample.   
Due to the high-heritage nature of the Spacecraft, most 
masses were well understood for the project.  However, some 
key mistakes were made in the design that resulted in needing 
significant ballasting to correct.  The first error was in the 
modeling and tracking of the harness mass.  Heritage values 
for the final flight harness had always come in within 5% of 
the model predictions, thus lower-than-normal contingencies 
were carried in the model. However, when the OSIRIS-REx 
harness completed construction and was delivered, the 
weight was almost 30% over the model predictions – a 
significant mass increase.  This was traced to a cost-savings 
opportunity that had been exercised to use wire from a 
common buy with another mission.  The wire contained extra 
shielding, resulting in the increased mass.  To further 
exasperate the problem, the extra shielding produced a 
thicker harness bundle, requiring more overwrap, resulting in 
even more mass gain, as well as having to reroute in some 
locations due to space constraints. This included needing to 
build harness ramps over propulsion lines due to insufficient 
clearances under the tubing as was originally proposed.  In 
addition, the harness mass is not evenly distributed about the 
Spacecraft; approximately 75% of the harness mass is near 
the C&DH and PDDU, however the component placements 
to balance the CM had been done with the significantly 
lighter harness.  Even after moving a battery to help offset the 
mass, ballasting was required on the order of 2.5% of the total 
Spacecraft mass to bring the CM back within requirements. 
While OSIRIS-REx had sufficient mass margins to 
accommodate this, this would have been disastrous for other 
missions.   
Figure 9 shows an image of the OSIRIS-REx harness bundle 
which caused the bulk of the mass and CM issues that arose 
on the project.   
 
Figure 9:  Harness Bundle 
Performance Trending 
The main performance measurements tracked and reported 
on a monthly basis throughout the development of the project 
were dry mass and power.  Both trends followed heritage 
profiles.  For mass, the trend continued to increase slowly, 
with big discrete changes at major deliveries.  The trend of 
mass throughout the project is shown in Figure 10, with the 
main mass drivers denoted. 
 
Figure 10:  Flight System Mass Trend 
 
Prior to PDR, the Not To Exceed (NTE) mass shifted up as 
the team established initial requirements for the launch 
vehicle procurement. The team then performed a trade and 
decided to provide additional margin for science by arriving 
at Bennu 14-months earlier than originally planned, thus 
resulting in a decrease in allowable dry mass.  In addition, 
minor adjustments to the trajectory resulted in delta V budget 
changes, which impacted the allowable dry mass for the fixed 
wet mass.  
 
As the Spacecraft, TAGSAM, and payload designs matured 
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prior to PDR, discrete jumps in the Current Best Estimate 
(CBE) and Maximum Expected Value (MEV) of mass for 
subsystems can be seen, with the largest jumps attributed to 
better definition of secondary bracketry requirements and 
gimbal sizing. In parallel with the early OSIRIS-REx 
development, MAVEN was into their Flight System 
integration, and incorporation of their as-measured masses 
for common components with OSIRIS-REx resulted in 
another discrete CBE mass increase between PDR and CDR.  
Finally, after the start of ATLO for OSIRIS-REx, the heavier 
harness mass was discovered as noted above.   
 
For power, the trend is very flat throughout the project.  Due 
to the high-heritage nature, most components had very solid 
power consumption numbers available.  Because the project 
had healthy power margins throughout development, the 
team was able to ease mission operations by allowing the 
arrays to stay in different fixed orientations throughout the 
flight, rather than continuously tracking, thereby avoiding 
implementation of a sun tracking algorithm.   
The biggest variables for power were:  available power from 
the arrays, and average heater load.  As the Solar Array model 
continued to be refined, some gains in available power were 
made, but the main change is decrease in load following 
system-level thermal vacuum where a lot of the conservatism 
in the thermal model is able to be removed.  Power modeling 
has historically held significant margin.  This is due to the use 
of using worst-case predictions for available power, as well 
as worst-case predictions for heater load.  While more 
complex methods could be implemented to Root-Sum-
Square these model inputs, traditionally, as was the case on 
OSIRIS-REx, it is easier to use the stacked-worst-case 
assumptions during development.  Figure 11 shows the trend 
in available power versus load throughout the development 
of the project.   
 
Figure 11:  Flight System Power Trend 
Mission Plan  
On the operations side, two key challenges for implementing 
the OSIRIS-REx mission plan included 1) the tight coupling 
between ground elements, particularly in executing the late 
update process described above, and 2) the operational need 
for and use of science data products.  As an example of the 
tight coupling between ground elements, a late update to 
science observation pointing parameters requires activities by 
all ground elements during the 24-hour late update period.  
After the DSN downlinks the latest optical navigation 
images, FDS must reconstruct the trajectory and predict the 
state of the spacecraft at the time of the observation.  The new 
predictions are delivered to the SPOC to determine if the 
observation pointing design needs to be updated to 
accommodate changes in the spacecraft’s predicted state, and 
if so, modify the design.  The updated observation pointing 
design is then delivered to the MSA to check against 
spacecraft constraints, prepare and verify the updated 
products, and send these to the DSN to uplink them to the 
spacecraft.  This need for the late update capability drove 
thorough definition of the interfaces between elements and 
significant testing of those interfaces and processes, testing 
which is ongoing and will continue until the spacecraft 
reaches Bennu in August of 2018. 
The second operations challenge involves having science in 
the operations loop.  The primary modus operandi for science 
in planetary missions is to receive data from the science 
instruments and process and analyze that data over relatively 
long time scales to support scientific investigations and 
publish results.  For OSIRIS-REx, products developed by 
mission scientists using tools and techniques developed for 
scientific inquiry are needed to navigate and guide the 
spacecraft and to select a suitable sampling site.  This requires 
the SPOC and science team to process instrument data on 
much tighter timelines than science operations personnel are 
accustomed to.  As an example, significant investment was 
made to develop the software, processes, interfaces, and team 
to use imagery from OSIRIS-REx’s suite of cameras to 
produce detailed shape and rotation state models of Bennu, 
along with accurately located and modeled surface 
“landmarks” for use by the FDS and on-board NFT software 
to navigate the spacecraft around Bennu and ultimately guide 
it to the surface to collect the sample.  To demonstrate this 
capability and all of the elements involved, a series of tests 
was performed in which simulated Approach and Preliminary 
Survey Phase imagery generated by the FDS team was used 
by the science team to construct shape and rotation state 
models, and landmarks, which were then passed back to the 
FDS team and used in a detailed simulation of landmark-
based navigation during the Orbital A Phase.  Further testing 
of the shape product generation and utilization processes by 
both FDS and NFT are planned during Outbound Cruise. 
 
6. RISK MANAGEMENT 
The biggest challenge for a planetary mission is staying on 
schedule.  Orbital dynamics of the solar system does not wait 
for the system to be ready.  If the project can stay on schedule 
and hit the first launch period, it will most likely stay in the 
cost box.  The problem for the systems engineer is 
maintaining the technical integrity of the mission despite 
strong management pressure to stay on schedule.  If the 
project is constantly reacting to issues, the chances are high 
that some fixes will be poorly thought out, merely addressing 
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the symptom without robustly correcting the cause.  The 
faster a project must respond to a problem, the more likely 
the fix will jeopardize mission success.  Proper risk 
management, where potential problems are identified early 
and mitigated, is essential to mission success. 
OSIRIS-REx developed a culture of risk identification and 
mitigation early on in the design phase.  The formal risk 
management process was structured to reinforce the culture, 
enabling the project to identify many potential problems and 
head them off before they became major issues.  Over 200 
risks were formally tracked at the project level, with only 
about 30 becoming problems, usually with substantially 
mitigated impact.  There were very few completely 
unexpected problems that hit the project during development, 
and the team had the time to fix those few problems without 
consequence to the mission objectives or reliability. 
The OSIRIS-REx risk management process was built on 
monthly meetings between the project systems engineer 
(PSE) and each element lead, during which they would 
update the status of the current risks and talk about any other 
concerns that might need tracking.  These informal meetings 
provided an opportunity for the PSE to talk with each lead 
one-on-one, gaining insight into the complexities of each 
element.  The environment fostered a frank discussion of 
concerns and risks without jumping into solutions or political 
posturing.  The project risk manager facilitated the discussion 
and logged the updates in the risk database.  After the one-
on-one meetings, a monthly risk management board meeting, 
chaired by the project manager, would gather all the leads, 
project management, the Principal Investigator, and the PSE 
together to go through the top risks and decide priorities for 
mitigations. 
OSIRIS-REx’s under-budget and on-time performance is a 
direct result of the project’s active risk management.  Project 
management used the risk management process to determine 
spending priorities, applying resources to mitigations with 
the greatest value.  The dollars spent on mitigating risks 
resulted in a net savings over time, allowing the project to 
spend additional dollars on additional risks.  The project had 
a healthy management reserve when it was selected, and 
management used that reserve effectively to prevent 
problems, rather than holding the money and spending it 
when problems manifested.   
7. REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT AND 
VERIFICATION 
Early in the design phase, the lead scientists embraced the 
requirements development and worked hard with the systems 
engineering team to define clear, verifiable requirements.  
The entire development effort revolved around the mission 
requirements defined in phase A, with very little change 
throughout the mission.  This stability was a key factor in 
achieving on-time delivery under cost. 
As the project proceeded into phase B, the individual 
instrument teams, the spacecraft team, and the ground 
elements each developed their element-level requirements 
which they linked back to the mission level.  At the project 
systems level, the verification engineer looked at the flow-
down from mission-level to element-level for every single 
mission requirement.  This was an extensive effort to validate 
the element-level requirements, with engineering judgment 
applied, and it uncovered a number of misunderstandings and 
disconnects across the team.  Detailed design proceeded in 
parallel with this effort, so there were times where the team 
needed to make some design changes, but the effort was early 
enough that the major disconnects were captured long before 
they significantly impacted cost or schedule. 
As soon as the flow-down validation was complete, the team 
turned its focus on the detailed plans for requirements 
verification.  With over 4000 requirements tracked at the 
project level, the work ahead needed to be carefully planned.  
The verification lead worked with each of the elements to 
establish appropriate tests and analyses.  They agreed on 
appropriate verification evidence up front.  And the 
verification lead established a clear process with a second set 
of expert eyes on every piece of evidence.  No requirement 
was formally closed until all the evidence was reviewed and 
in place under configuration control.  The team closed an 
average of 250 requirements a month over a 15-month period 
leading up to launch. 
At a high level, the requirements management and 
verification effort was very much like a text-book example.  
But the devil in the details that is hard to covey is the 
importance of the knowledge and perspective that the 
verification engineer brings to the task.  Our verification 
engineer took to heart the fact that a mistake in the element 
requirements development early on will lead to large cost and 
schedule impacts later, and a mistake in requirements 
verification at the end can result in loss of mission.  He 
applied engineering judgment to all his work, constantly 
asking, “Does this make sense?”  He set the tone for the team, 
and brought in the appropriate experts to review the work.  
During system-level integration, the project had very few 
problems because the right verification work was done early.  
In flight so far, the system is performing very well. 
More details on the OSIRIS-REx requirements verification 
effort can be found in Stevens [5]. 
8. VALIDATION  
First, a few definitions, to help differentiate verification from 
validation: Verification is the process of determining that a 
system satisfies its requirements and specifications; it 
answers the question “did we build the system right?”  
Validation is the process of determining that a proposed 
system solves the problem for which it is intended; it answers 
the question “did we build the right system?” 
For the OSIRIS-REx validation, the project took a two 
phased approach.  The first phase of requirements validation 
precedes the design solution and shows that a design based 
on the requirements will be the right system design prior to 
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anything being built from the design.  This has largely been 
accomplished as part of the requirements walk-through / 
tabletop / peer review process.  The second phase of 
validation is concerned with showing the designed and tested 
system meets the intended function originally specified.  This 
largely consists of putting the flight system through targeted 
testing with most, but not all of the validation activity being 
performed at the flight system level. 
For the flight-system validation level testing, the team created 
a representative set of operational scenarios against which the 
OSIRIS-REx flight system was validated.  These scenarios 
were derived from the DRM.  Level 3 spacecraft 
requirements were then linked to the individual scenarios 
where they were validated by the scenarios.  The validation 
program exercised and replicated, to the extent feasible, a 
representative set of nominal and off-nominal / failed states 
and modes of operation. 
The SVT’s used in the flight system validation were: 
1)  Launch  
2)  Launch – Off Nominal 
3)  Outbound Cruise 
4)  Science Reconnaissance 
5)  Science Survey 
6)  Science TAG 
7)  Science TAG– Off Nominal 
8)  Science NFT TAG 
9)  Science NFT TAG – Off Nominal 
10)  Earth Return (and SRC Deploy) 
11)  Earth Return – Off Nominal 
These tests directly correspond to specific phases of the 
DRM. 
For OSIRIS-REx, many of the specific validation events 
occur during the SVT’s on the spacecraft, during the 
Operational Readiness Tests (ORT’s), and during the 
Mission Readiness Tests (MRT’s).  The SVT’s used flight-
like, MSA / Ground-Data-System-generated sequences in 
tests that were run on the flight system, using realistic 
(nominal) scenarios.  The project ground-system 
organization managed the ORT’s. Launch ORT was 
conducted prior to launch to validate proper readiness for the 
event. The ORTs utilized test beds in lieu of the spacecraft 
for post-launch activities.  Finally, the two MRTs validate the 
SPOC's ability to develop instrument commands using the 
operations tools, and then this test was performed with the 
entire OSIRIS-REx mission operations system in the loop.   
Additionally, the OSIRIS-REx project conducted a Risk 
Reduction Test (RRT) program, beginning toward the end of 
the flight software system integration process.  Risk 
reduction testing was almost entirely performed on SoftSim 
test beds (no hardware in the loop).  RRT scenarios were 
based on Fault Tree branches and some test cases took the 
form of multiple-fault “stress tests.”  In the end, the RRT 
program was used to ensure the flight system behaved as 
expected to support the OSIRIS-REx mission. 
Finally, in terms of validation closeout, every validation 
event was individually assigned to a responsible system 
engineer.  In addition, the validation procedures include the 
details for close-out, including which organization is 
responsible for analyzing the results (i.e., subsystem, fault 
protection, etc.), and which individuals must sign off on the 
declaration of a validation activity’s success or failure. 
Validation event was considered closed when the following 
occurred: 
1. Data review has been completed and signed-off. 
2. All steps in the test procedure were followed, or 
written rationale provided for why any steps were 
skipped 
3. All applicable configurations in the Mission Plan are 
included in the test setup 
4. Successful execution of command sequence(s) and 
scripts has been verified.  This includes the absence 
of rejected commands, proper operation of the 
involved sequence engine(s), proper command 
execution times, correct command counters 
throughout the test. 
5. Correct fault protection execution has been verified.  
This includes any expected fault protection 
execution, as well as the lack of unexpected 
execution (i.e., correct fault counters throughout the 
test). 
6. Availability of adequate telemetry data both in real-
time and in recorded / playback form has been 
verified (i.e., that we have access to the data we need 
in order to judge whether things worked).  Also, any 
telemetry anomalies are fully understood or 
documented in writing. 
7. Any relevant problem reports opened during test 
execution that are test liens have been closed. 
8. Compliance with flight rules, constraints, and 
mission rules has been verified.  Any idiosyncrasies 
must be explained in writing, as needed. 
 
9. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
OSIRIS-REx has been a huge development success.  The 
flight system launched on schedule and under budget without 
compromising on the reliability or performance of the 
system.  The operations phase is well planned out, with 
significant funding available.  The efforts of over 1500 
individuals came together to build a system that is well-
placed to achieve all objectives, amazing the world with 
views of an object that has never been seen, teaching us 
something about predicting asteroid trajectories and how we 
might alter them to protect the Earth, and returning material 
that will be analyzed for decades. 
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During the five-and-a-half-year development effort, the team 
overcame numerous obstacles.  But the effort was made much 
easier by a culture geared toward success.  The Principal 
Investigator established a pattern of open communication 
early on.  The Lockheed Martin team took a close look at the 
heritage hardware and software, and openly presented its 
weaknesses in front of their customer.  When problems arose, 
team members were not reluctant to ask for help.  Overall, the 
team looked forward toward mission success, anticipating 
problems and tackling them before they became 
insurmountable.   
The project promoted a culture of listening to team members 
and reviewers.  Whether or not the project changed course 
due to another perspective, the person who spoke up knew 
that the team had considered the idea.  The project took all 
actions from reviewers very seriously, formally driving them 
to closure.  The utilization of diverse perspectives helped the 
team identify risks long before they became problems. 
OSIRIS-REx has demonstrated the positive effects of good 
risk management.  The keys to this process were (1) good 
communication of risk from the lower levels through a 
culture of risk identification and mitigation; and (2) active use 
of the risk management information by project management 
when deciding where to spend reserves. 
Heritage components provided significant cost savings and 
development risk reduction, but there are some clear cautions 
when using heritage.  Heritage components and the testing of 
those components must be thoroughly reviewed for the new 
application.  Old heritage designs will require significant 
effort to recover the documentation and some design 
information will be unavailable, so plan a thorough test 
program with plenty of extra schedule.  Don’t forget about 
the ripple effects across the system of any changes to heritage 
components. 
The team stumbled across some previous lessons learned, 
too.  It is difficult to not get complacent with heritage 
systems.  And there will always be the unexpected problems.  
In general, though, the project kept its focus.  A solid 
verification and validation program caught numerous errors 
before they became significant problems.  
Designing to explore and sample a largely unknown object 
was made easier with a strong partnership between science 
and engineering.  The Design Reference Asteroid codified the 
asteroid environment, and the Mission Requirements 
Document and Design Reference Mission provided clear 
direction to the team.  That partnership will continue through 
operations as the project collects data and learns about 
Bennu. 
OSIRIS-REx still has 7 years left before the Sample Return 
Capsule brings its extraterrestrial cargo safely to Earth.  We 
cannot claim mission success.  However we have reached a 
major milestone, and the flight system hardware cannot be 
changed.  We have all learned a bit more about building space 
flight systems, and hopefully that knowledge will be of 
benefit to others. 
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